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Advance fee fraud is a significant component of online crim-
inal activity. Fraudsters can often make off with significant
sums, and victims will usually find themselves plagued by
follow-up scams. Previous studies of how fraudsters per-
suade their victims have been limited to the initial solicita-
tion emails sent to a broad population of email users. In this
paper, we use the lens of scam-baiting – a vigilante activ-
ity whereby members of the public intentionally waste the
time of fraudsters – to move beyond this first contact and
examine the persuasive tactics employed by a fraudster once
their victim has responded to a scam. We find linguistic pat-
terns in scammer and baiter communications that suggest
that the mode of persuasion used by scammers shifts over
a conversation, and describe a corresponding stage model
of scammer persuasion strategy. We design and evaluate
a number of classifiers for identifying scam-baiting conver-
sations amidst regular email, and for separating scammer
from baiter messages based on their textual content, achiev-
ing high classification accuracy for both tasks. This forms
a crucial basis for automated intervention, with a tool for
identifying victims and a model for understanding how they
are currently being exploited.
Keywords
Scam-baiting, advance fee fraud, mass-marketing fraud, per-
suasion, cybercrime
1. INTRODUCTION
Advance fee fraud typically involves promising its victims
wealth, gifts, prizes or employment in exchange for a small
advance payment. If a victim goes along with the story
and pays the fee, fraudsters either completely disappear or
invent a series of difficulties which require further payment
from the victim until the victim is out of money or stops pay-
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ing. Advance fee frauds have been aﬄicting people’s lives for
hundreds of years. In the 16th century, businessmen were
contacted by an individual claiming to be in correspondence
with a wealthy person imprisoned in Spain – usually alleged
to be an unknown/remote relative of the victim who was re-
lying on this individual to arrange his release. In exchange
for a small amount of money required to bribe the prison
guards, the victim would receive a reward once this person
was smuggled out of prison. Another variant of the fraud
dates back to the 19th century, mentioning a casket con-
taining 16,000 francs in gold and the diamonds of a late
marchioness and showing a remarkably high resemblance to
the suspicious emails people receive today [9]:
“Sir, you will be doubtlessly be astonished to be
receiving a letter from a person unknown to you,
who is about to ask a favour from you [...]”
The proliferation of the Internet and easy access to email
harvesting software gave rise to more modern variants of the
Spanish prisoner scam, such as black money scams, lottery
frauds, employment scams, online sales and rental frauds,
work-at-home scams, romance scams, etc. A few examples:
• The victim has won a large cash prize, a lottery jackpot
or an inheritance and in order to claim it they must
send a small payment as a release fee.
• An implausible series of events has occurred and the
victim’s help is required in getting money out of the
scammer’s country, which will normally involve mak-
ing a series of payments.
• The victim is promised a dream job, but has to make
payments for taxes, visas, “anti-terrorism certificates”
or any number of other formalities.
These messages are delivered in bulk by spam-delivery
networks, operated by other cybercriminals who lease out
their (stolen) equipment to send email. For a majority of
the audience, such emails will go unread, consigned to a
spam folder, or else manually identified as spam and deleted
or ignored1. However, for the respondents, this email will be
the start of multiple conversations, the end result of which
1For more precise statistics on the ratio of spam solicitation
to response and conversion, we refer to the reader to Kanich
et al. [5]
will be the loss of money, if not their identities or even their
lives2.
In the first part of this paper, we present our approach
to automatically distinguish advance fee fraud-related email
exchanges from regular professional and personal email con-
versations included in the Enron dataset. Such a system al-
lows for the detection of an ongoing exchange that relates to
a fraudulent arrangement, instead of merely identifying the
original scammer solicitation email. Additionally, because
rapid intervention is essential to safeguard the respondents
from further losses, we go on to investigate the feasibility
of automatically distinguishing between scammer and re-
spondent messages. This task can be expected to be more
challenging than separating the texts authored by scammers
from general email communications due to the close similar-
ity in topic and language usage. Because there are no ac-
tual scammer-victim exchanges available (yet), we examine
scam-baiting conversations.
Scam-baiting is something of a vigilante activity, wherein
a scam-baiter responds to a scam email which solicits an
advance fee or similar fraud, and engages with the fraudster
in order to waste their time and inconvenience them with
thankless tasks, all the while acting the part of a duped
victim. This is often done for the scam-baiter’s own amuse-
ment, but justified by a maxim that any time and energy
spent by a fraudster in dealing with scam-baiters distracts
them from engaging with and defrauding actual victims.
Most pertinently, scam-baiters commonly publish transcripts
of their engagements for public appraisal, giving the public a
rare, if atypical, insight into the stages of advance fee fraud
which follow on from the more broadly recognised solicita-
tion letters3.
Secondly, in this study we attempt to understand the dif-
ferent stages of persuasion in online scammer conversations.
While such persuasion strategies have been studied before
(e.g. [1, 8, 4]), the analysis of scammer strategies is usu-
ally restricted to the initial solicitation email. Hence, the
existing literature fails to properly analyse the persuasive
strategies which emerge later in the conversation, where a
respondent is talked into becoming a victim. Therefore, in
the second part of this paper we contribute to a more general
linguistic understanding of the strategies of persuasion in ad-
vance fee email frauds by analysing entire scammer/scam-
baiter conversations.
The novel contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. The description of a novel dataset of cleaned and la-
belled scammer/scam-baiter exchanges, the Advance
Fee Scam-baiting dataset, sourced from active scam-
baiter communities.
2. The development of a highly accurate classification
system for distinguishing scam-baiting exchanges from
normal email traffic (F1=0.971) and scammer from
scam-baiter messages (Acc=0.963) based upon both
2Aside from losses due to suicide, victims who travel out
to meet scammers are in some cases murdered. A US
congressional report from 1998 estimated 17 such deaths
from known cases [Combating International African Crime:
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Africa of House Comm. on
Int’l Rel. (July 15, 1998) http://commdocs.house.gov/
committees/intlrel/hfa50884.000/hfa50884_0.htm ].
3A more detailed description of the scam-baiting community
is provided by Zingerle [11]
theAdvance Fee Scam-baiting and the Enron dataset,
comparing a range of classification approaches and fea-
ture sets.
3. A statistical analysis of scammer and scam-baiter com-
munications throughout exchanges, examining corre-
lations of linguistic categories with message sequence,
and patterns which develop when these categories are
aggregated.
4. The generation of a prospective linguistic outline of
the persuasive process employed by scammers, includ-
ing the notable result that persuasion used later in
the exchanges differs from that visible in solicitation
emails.
Our classifier results demonstrate that scammer commu-
nications can be automatically identified, and the parties
in these exchanges accurately labelled to enable automatic
intervention. Further, our analysis of the conversational pat-
terns of scammers and scam-baiters reveals that persuasive
strategies employed can shift, leading us to pose a model of
scammer persuasion. Our results validate the necessity of
studying full transcripts to understand persuasion.
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2 we present
background research on scam-baiting and advance fee fraud.
In Section 3 we describe the scam-baiting dataset underpin-
ning our analyses. In Section 4 we present results of an
experiment classifying scammer and scam-baiter messages
based on their textual content, and in Section 5 we discuss
the presentation of various linguistic features across the ob-
served conversations, drawing out notable correlations and
patterns. In Section 6 we outline a resulting understanding
of scammer persuasive strategy, and discuss the implications
and directions for future work.
2. RELATEDWORK
Previous work on scam-baiting data has mainly focused on
qualitative assessment and categorisation of scam-baiter ac-
tivities [11]. Regarding advance fee fraud specifically, prior
studies often focus their analysis on the components of the
initial solicitation messages. Chang [1] provides one such
analysis, tracing aspects of Cialdini’s influence theory [2] in
six examples of advance-fee fraud solicitation emails, find-
ing presentations and assertions of authority, as well as a
tendency towards urgency to pressure victims into taking
decision-making short cuts.
Jakobsson [4] comes to similar conclusions in his investiga-
tion of the solicitation emails for a variety of scams. He bases
his analysis on the principles laid out by Ferreira et al [3]
as underlying phishing. Namely, these are the principles of
Authority, Social Proof, Liking, Similarity, Deception, Com-
mitment, Reciprocation, Consistency and Distraction. His
conclusions are that Commitment, Reciprocation and Con-
sistency combined with Distraction and Deception are the
most frequently applied across email scam solicitation, with
Authority playing a secondary role. A typical example of
the application of these principles is the lottery scam, in
which the victim feels obliged to respond to a request, such
as paying a fee to obtain the prize, by focusing on what can
be gained, instead of the fraudulent nature of the request.
While informative, these analyses do not go further than
understanding the principles of persuasion that are used in
the initial solicitation email. A linguistic model that in-
corporates the different stages in the scammer’s persuasive
strategies throughout a series of email exchanges is – to our
knowledge – lacking. With the analyses provided in this
study, we aim to contribute to forming the first step towards
such an understanding.
3. DATA SOURCES
3.1 The Advance Fee Scam-baiting Dataset
Our Advance Fee Scam-baiting dataset is collected
from public transcripts posted by members of the “419eater”
scam-baiting community4 in the 419eater archives and mem-
bers’ forum, supplemented by transcripts posted at the site
“What’s the Bloody Point?”5. The corpus currently consists
of 57 complete exchanges, numbering 2,248 messages.
Each email in the dataset is annotated with the role of the
author (scammer or scam-baiter). The ratio of messages is
slightly in favour of scammers, at 1162 : 1086. Although
the majority of transcripts begin with the initial solicitation
message from the scammer, 5 open instead with a message
from the baiter, after an explanation of the context. The
corpus covers a spread of dates from 2003 to 2015, with an
average of 38 messages per exchange. We show a sample of
such an exchange in Appendix A.
3.2 The Enron Dataset
The Enron Dataset contains around 0.5M professional
and personal email messages from about 150 different peo-
ple. Most of these people were part of the senior manage-
ment of Enron at the time of the dataset’s collection as part
of a corruption investigation. A more complete description
of the Enron corpus is provided by Klimt & Yang [6]. The
dataset is freely available online6. To simulate a real-life
data distribution in our experiments, we randomly selected
1,000 email conversations from the Enron Dataset, with an
average of 40 messages per exchange.
4. AUTOMATICDETECTIONOFADVANCE
FEE EMAIL COMMUNICATIONS
In this section we discuss our methodology to automati-
cally distinguish between fraudulent advance fee emails and
regular professional and personal email conversations. Our
approach to this task is based on text categorisation and in-
volves the creation of document representations based on a
selected set of linguistic features, feature selection using sta-
tistical techniques, and classification using machine learning
algorithms. We describe each of these steps in the following
subsections.
4.1 Data Pre-processing
Postings on scam-baiting websites can contain annota-
tions or comments from the scam-baiters which are inserted
to explain events or to comment upon the strategies of the
scammers. Because this text was not part of the original
email conversations, the first step in pre-processing consisted
of removing it from the transcripts. This was accomplished
4http://www.419eater.com
5http://www.whatsthebloodypoint.com/
6https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~./enron/ (last accessed on
26/01/17).
through a semi-automated process, whereby comments in-
serted according to a conventional format were extracted
automatically and further unconventional comments were
manually removed. Likewise, any direct references to Enron
were removed from the Enron Dataset.
Next, we tokenised all messages. Because of the non-
standard language use that is often present in the data, the
tokenization process consisted of splitting up each message
in a list of words and punctuation marks, but concatenated
forms (e.g. “somepeopleaˆA˘I˙) and incorrectly spelled words
(e.g. “whelther”) were left unchanged, because such “linguis-
tic noise” could be informative to distinguish between scam-
mer and non-scammer emails during the experiments. We
stripped punctuation, standardised all tokens to lower-case,
replaced numeric sequences with a number token, and re-
placed sequences of ‘X’-marks with a token indicating omit-
ted information. Finally, an implementation of the Porter
stemming algorithm was used to reduce words to canonical
forms.
4.2 Feature Selection
In text categorisation, a document representation (in our
case a series of consecutive emails written by a scammer,
a scam-baiter or an Enron employee) is composed of differ-
ent types of linguistic features, the selection of which can
significantly affect the performance of the machine learn-
ing algorithm. In this case, four different feature sets were
explored:
• BOW features: the set of all words occurring in the
data-set (Bag-Of-Words features).
• Frequent Term features: the set of terms occurring
more than a cut-off frequency (40 times) in the doc-
ument corpus, excluding common English stop-words
and any obvious personal or corporate names. Term
frequencies were recorded for each message.
• Semantic features: manually-created categories from
the list of frequent terms, such as terms relating to fi-
nance (e.g. “money”, “cash”, “amount”) or legalities
(“lawyer”, “form”, “contract”). These categories were
partially based on prior work by [4]. Additionally, af-
ter manually analyzing part of the scam-baiting con-
versations, we decided to add a number of extra cate-
gories that seemed typical of online scammers’ persua-
sive strategies. Category frequencies were recorded for
each message. All categories, together with a few ex-
amples for each category are displayed in Appendix B.
• LIWC features: previously-existing dictionary terms
mapped to categories, from the LIWC 2015 dictio-
nary [7]. Category frequencies were recorded for each
message.
All features were drawn from the subject line and main
text of each message.
4.3 Experiments and Results
Using our labelled datasets of scammer/scam-baiter/regular
exchanges, we first trained and evaluated a variety of clas-
sifiers for the task of distinguishing between regular email
conversations (Non-scam messages drawn from the Enron
dataset) and scam-baiting exchanges (Scam Either from
the Advance Fee Scam-baiting dataset). Additionally,
Classifier Scam Either Non-scam
Acc. Prec. Rec. F-sc. Prec. Rec. F-sc.
NB BOW 98.3 85.5 100.0 92.2 100.0 98.1 99.0
NB LIWC 93.3 73.4 51.8 60.7 94.8 97.9 96.3
NB Semantic 92.5 82.2 33.0 47.1 93.0 99.2 96.0
NB FreqTerms 94.0 63.5 94.6 76.0 99.4 93.9 96.6
LR BOW 99.4 100.0 93.5 96.7 99.3 100.0 99.7
LR LIWC 99.4 100.0 93.5 96.7 99.3 100.0 99.7
LR Semantic 98.8 99.0 88.9 93.7 98.8 99.9 99.4
LR FreqTerms 99.4 100.0 93.5 96.7 99.3 100.0 99.7
SVM BOW 99.4 100.0 93.5 96.7 99.3 100.0 99.7
SVM LIWC 99.4 100.0 93.5 96.7 99.3 100.0 99.7
SVM Semantic 99.3 100.0 92.6 96.2 99.2 100.0 99.6
SVM FreqTerms 99.5 100.0 94.4 97.1 99.4 100.0 99.7
Table 1: Overall accuracy, precision and recall for distin-
guishing between the Enron and the Advance Fee Scam-
baiting dataset.
we set up experiments in which we attempted to separate
messages authored by scammers (Scammer) from those au-
thored by scam-baiters (Scam-baiter) within the Advance
Fee Scam-baiting dataset.
Our system was developed using ten-fold cross validation
(cf. [10]). In this experimental regime, the available data is
randomised and divided into ten equally sized folds or par-
titions. Subsequently, each partition is used nine times in
training and once in test. During the splitting, the email
messages were clustered by conversation, to ensure that no
message used in validation was part of a conversation with
other messages visible in training, which prevented over-
fitting of features which may be particular to a given scam
or pair of conversation partners.
The feature sets we described in Section 4.2 were trialled
in three different classifiers, in evaluations carried out over
our two datasets. The classifiers used were support vector
machines with a linear kernel (SVM), naive Bayesian clas-
sifiers (NB) and binomial logistic regression (LR). Parame-
ters were experimentally determined on a development set
of each training partition during cross validation.
Table 1 and 2 present the overall accuracy of each clas-
sifier and show the precision, recall and F-score for each
category in both experimental set-ups. During the first se-
ries of experiments (Non-scam vs. Scam Either) the best
result was achieved by the SVM classifier using Frequent
Term features. The scam-baiting email conversations were
successfully identified with an F-score of 97.1%. Of the in-
dividual feature sets, the frequent terms were generally the
best performing, and the Semantic the poorest performing.
When distinguishing between scammers and scam-baiters,
the BOW features yielded the best results. When detecting
the scammers of our Advance Fee Scam-baiting dataset
the SVM yielded a best overall accuracy score of 96.3%.




Although scammers are constantly changing the content
of their emails in order to prevent detection by scam fil-
ter software, the use of persuasion remains a critical marker
Classifier Scammer Scam-baiter
Acc. Prec. Rec. F-sc. Prec. Rec. F-sc.
NB BOW 95.5 94.7 96.4 95.6 96.4 94.6 95.5
NB LIWC 68.8 66.7 75.0 70.6 71.4 62.5 66.7
NB Semantic 70.5 73.5 64.3 68.7 68.2 76.8 72.3
NB FreqTerms 92.7 90.0 96.4 93.1 96.2 89.3 92.6
LR BOW 95.4 95.0 96.6 95.8 95.8 93.9 94.9
LR LIWC 81.5 85.5 79.7 82.5 77.4 83.7 80.4
LR Semantic 82.4 83.3 84.5 84.0 81.3 79.6 80.4
LR FreqTerms 93.5 91.9 96.6 94.2 95.7 89.8 92.6
SVM BOW 96.3 95.1 98.3 96.7 97.9 93.9 95.8
SVM LIWC 85.2 87.7 84.8 86.2 82.4 85.7 84.0
SVM Semantic 85.2 86.4 86.4 86.4 83.7 83.7 83.7
SVM FreqTerms 94.4 92.1 98.3 95.1 97.8 89.8 93.6
Table 2: Overall accuracy, precision and recall for distin-
guishing between the scammers and scam-baiters in the Ad-
vance Fee Scam-baiting dataset.
for fraudsters attempting to trick or manipulate people into
giving up money. In this section, we discuss our analysis
of semantic markers within the scammer and scam-baiter
conversations, scrutinising such persuasive content as it oc-
curs in an extended discussion, rather than only the initial
solicitation email.
5.1 Conversation Level Analysis
Conversations were normalised by binning messages ac-
cording to which decile of the overall transcript length they
fell into. Feature weights were then calculated for each bin
according to the proportion of that feature’s overall pre-
sentation which appears in each location. For interpreta-
tion purposes, a uniform distribution (the null model) would
present as a proportion of 0.1 in each decile.
As Figures 1a and 1b show, a scammer’s initial solicitation
email and its immediate follow-up are packed with details of
the scam set-up, selling why and how the victim should en-
gage with the con. Traces of some typical persuasive strate-
gies are displayed, such as the assumption of authority and
language usage stressing the urgency of a transaction. Also
visible is a concentration of attention on secrecy and security
of communication, all within the first few exchanges.
As the conversation continues, however, these elements
become secondary to the focus on the second-person. The
transition suggests that the scammer is moving away from
strategies based on combinations of principles of authority
and distraction, and towards strategies based on liking, sim-
ilarity and reciprocity [4].
For the scam-baiters, a very similar picture appears, with
their initial messages more densely packed with counter-
ploys that they hope to hook the scammer’s attention with,
including the presentation of difficulties complying with in-
struction, and demands for tokens of good faith. These tac-
tics are either enabled or abandoned relatively soon after.
Notably low in the initial exchange are references to travel,
a gambit which appears to be deployed only later on in the
proceedings.
Looking at traces of emotional terms in Figures 2a and 2b,
an interesting pattern emerges. The scammers’ use of swear-
words seems to peak around the fourth decile of the ex-
change, possibly reflecting an early loss of patience, or an
(a) Scammers’ use of tactical terms (b) Baiters’ use of tactical terms
Figure 1: Term categories related to scammer and scam-baiter strategies, over email transcripts
(a) Scammers’ use of emotionally-loaded terms (b) Baiters’ use of emotionally-loaded terms
Figure 2: Emotion and sincerity over email transcripts
Figure 3: Scammers’ use of financially-connected terms
attempt at intimidation. Around the same time, language
usage reflecting termination also increases, indicating the
scammer is threatening to call off the arrangement. This
is followed by a spike in words related to trustworthiness
and sincerity and a drop in swearword usage, which then
returns dramatically towards the end of the conversation.
This corresponds roughly with an increase in references to
urgency and travel on the part of the scam-baiter. In combi-
nation, these tracks suggest a common pattern whereby the
scammer loses patience midway through the conversation –
perhaps because the scam-baiter has yet to deliver on their
end of what is required for the con – and is pacified by the
scam-baiter with a recognition of the urgency of the trans-
action, and a suggestion of a new means of delivery (which
is in fact just another gambit to waste the scammer’s time
and resources).
Finally, with regard to financial references in particular,
which include the scammers’ ultimate goal of persuading
their victims to transfer money, Figure 3 shows that scam-
mers make less mention of money transfer services (e.g.,
Western Union) in the first part of their conversations. In-
stead, they raise the matter further on into the process. This
is typically followed by the peak in verbal aggression we
mention above. The distribution of financial terms declines
slightly as the conversation moves into the liking and sim-
ilarity phase and then rises again towards the end of the
conversation, in a final effort to obtain the money they are
seeking.
5.2 Persuasion Stage Model
Based on the results of our analysis, an outline of the per-
suasive strategies that are employed by advance fee scam-
mers is given in Figure 4, as described below:
1. SOLICITATION. In the solicitation email, the scam-
mer’s most visible communication, a widely-distributed
email typically outlines the plot of the scam. This is
a hard sell, and scammers tend to use an entire range
Figure 4: Scammer persuasive process
of persuasive aids to bolster their case. To start with,
they create a false persona. With this strategy, scam-
mers attempt to persuade their victims either by pre-
tending to be a person of authority – people tend
to respond to requests from a figure of authority (e.g.
a bank director) – or by creating a likeable persona
to whom the victim can relate to or sympathise with
(e.g. a poor orphan). In the latter plot, scammers tend
to present themselves as being trustworthy. As was
mentioned by [4], people feel more confident in their
decisions if they like the person they are following or
if the person seems familiar or similar to themselves.
In both cases, the fraudster attempts to distract the
victim with promises of a reward (a large amount of
money or a dream job) and the urgency of the vic-
tim’s reply. Additionally, stress is made of the secrecy
required. If not, the reward will somehow be lost.
2. FORMAL EXTRACTION. The recipient having re-
sponded, the scammers reply in line with their ploy,
providing information for means of further communi-
cation and the method by which an advance fee should
be paid or account information transferred. The recip-
ient is typically asked to transfer the money through
a money transfer service in which the recipient
can remain anonymous, the transaction cannot be re-
versed, the money cannot be traced afterwards and
the recipient can collect it at one of many locations
(e.g. Western Union or MoneyGram). The focus here
is funnelling the recipient into a procedure – references
to legalities and financial words are numerous.
3. IRRITATION. If the recipient proves reluctant or presents
difficulties, the scammer responds first of all with nega-
tion and reminders of secrecy and urgency, and
then with a spike of verbal aggression (swearwords)
and a threat to end their association (termination).
This increases the pressure on the recipient to submit
to demands.
4. PERSONAL APPEAL. If appeased, the scammer shifts
from their previous strategy of guiding the recipient
through a procedure, and shifts to more of a personal
focus on the recipient (you), with a renewed effort to
present themselves as likeable and trustworthy (religious).
They may agree for or even encourage the recipient to
travel in person to deliver funds.
5. ABANDONMENT. If the conversation drags on too
long, or becomes too tiresome, the scammer will grow
irritated, verbal aggression will return, and they often
stop replying and move on to other targets.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we showed that it is feasible to design a
system that can automatically separate advance fee email
conversations from regular professional and personal email
exchanges while maintaining the complex conditions of a
real life scenario – a large, highly skewed dataset. Addi-
tionally, we demonstrated that the system can identify both
the fraudster and the potential victim on the conversational
level with high accuracy, despite the similarities we attested
in the Advance Fee Scam-baiting dataset.
Additionally, the analysis we presented in the second part
of this study revealed a number of hints about how scammer-
victim conversations may progress. Most importantly, there
is a strong indication that the scammer solicitation emails
studied by previous literature are not representative of the
rest of their interaction with victims, a result which stresses
the importance of studying full exchanges. In our analysis,
we identified a shift in language use on the part of scammers
as transcripts progress, and postulate corresponding stages
in scammer strategy. Further work will explore whether
these stages can be manually labelled with consistency, and
if so, then whether these stages can be identified by machine
learning processes.
Our dataset of scam-baiting transcripts by no means ex-
hausts the available data, which exists in a variety of for-
mats. Additional data collection may lend itself to new in-
sights about scam-baiting conversations and scammer strat-
egy.
However, it must be acknowledged that the conclusions
drawn from scam-baiting exchanges must be viewed cau-
tiously for application to scammer-victim interactions. Scam-
baiters are not victims, and in many ways their contributions
to exchanges may more closely resemble those of scammers.
The classifier we have developed in this paper demonstrates
that this issue is not insurmountable, but the influence that
they exert on the conversation remains to be examined.
For example, it is widely known that the fees required by
advance fee fraudsters are rarely singular in nature – a single
payment extracted will be followed by demands for yet more
payments. As such, it is likely that stages 2, 3 and 4 in our
process described above are cyclical in nature, with scam-
mers entering the process via the solicitation and rotating
through the tactics until the victim ceases to present a good
prospect, and then abandoning them. As scam-baiters never
surrender money, it is not possible to properly observe these
cycles in scam-baiting transcripts. As a result, our future
research will focus on establishing whether this is evident
in actual scammer-victim transcripts, and generally exam-
ine the comparability of scam-baiter and scammer-victim
exchanges.
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Scam-baiter Mssr Kouame, I was directed to contact you by Barrister Andy Coulibally. He had quoted fees that were
to be charged for supplying documents, as below: Change of Ownership;- $950.00. Affidavit of Oath;-
$1,025.00. Letter of Authorization; $900.00. Total. $2,875.00. IMO these fees are outrageous. I would like
you to explain why they are so high. Regards, Eliza Dane
Scammer Attention Eliza Dane, this is prior to your mail to this court regarding the fee to obtain some legal documents
as requested by barrister Andy Coulibally,I want to tell you that the fee as was issued the barrister is for both
processing legalisation at the justice ministry here. But if you want the processing and legalisation fee to be
deducted from the fee then the total fee to get the mentioned documents is $1,950 only,the processing and
legalisation fee is $925. you are advice therefore to liase with your local representative here barrister Andy
Coulibally and remmit the fee to him to enable him come and pay the fee for collection of the 3 documents
respectively. But if you wish,you can also pay in the money here directly through the informations as was
given to you by the barrister. Thanks for your understanding. Messr Richard Kouame
Scam-baiter Mr Kouame, Please answer the question. Eliza Dane
Scammer Ms Dane, What answer do you require again?.I have told you in my last mail that the cost as was highlighted
to you by Barrister Andy Coulibally is for both the processing and legalisation of the documents at the
ministry of justice.The normal cost to get the three documents is $1,950 while $925 is for processing and
legalisation at the jusice ministry.The above price cost is the normal governmental price to purchase such
documents and oaths in this country. We have no room for any curiousity solution here,For more details
you can liase with your representative to get more facts. Messr Richard Kouame
Scam-baiter Mr Kouame, To put it bluntly, I don’t believe you. I did a bit of research and found that what you’re
charging is equal to something like two years’ income for the average citizen of Cote d’Ivoire. How you can
write “The normal cost to get the three documents is $1,950 while $925 is for processing and legalisation at
the jusice ministry... cost is the normal governmental price to purchase such documents and oaths in this
country” and keep a straight face is a mystery. I want the real price, not the one you quote when you try to
gouge foreigners. Eliza Dane
Scammer Ms Dane, We have no time for all this cross questioning,you have been told that this fee as highlighted is
the minimum fee imposed by the government to get such ducuments in this country.If you need redress of
this fee then it’s you who will state how much you will be able to pay.If your bargain is acceptebale by the
judicial commitee,then we will proceed but if it’s not accepted,that means quit. Indicate what you will be
able to pay and stop embibing curiuosity. Messr Richard Kouame
Scam-baiter Mr Kouame, Fine – if you insist on charging this much, send me an invoice for the fee. Eliza Dane
B. SEMANTIC DICTIONARY
Category Examples
numbers “one”,“two”,“three”
locations “nigeria”,“africa”,“ghana”
times “monday”,“tuesday”,“wednesday”
urgency “urgent”,“asap”,“immedi”
titles “mrs”,“mr”,“dr”
address “attn”,“dear”,“hello”
organisations “ministri”,“foundat”,“board”
communicationmediums “phone”,“telephon”,“email”
communicationforms “promis”,“clear”,“say”
postal “post”,“packag”,“mail”
insults “stink”,“turd”,“dumb”
finances “money”,“advanc”,“amount”
legalities “form”,“receipt”,“offici”
travel “travel”,“meet”,“flight”
religious “bless”,“church”,“lord”
relationships “bother”,“sister”,“father”
secondperson “ye”,“you”,“your”
firstsingulars “i”,“me”,“mine”
firstplurals “we”,“us”,“togeth”
business “secretari”,“job”,“presid”
assistance “assist”,“help”,“develop”
emotion bad “concern”,“sorri”,“afraid”
emotion good “delight”,“like”,“interest”
desire “hope”,“wish”,“interest”
termination “end”,“death”,“close”
beginning “start”,“make”,“pose”
alteration “chang”,“els”,“therefor”
trust “assur”,“ensur”,“believ”
doubt “question”,“actual”,“wast”
authority “mp”,“repres”,“director”
deal “process”,“ventur”,“plan”
secrecy “code”,“privat”,“password”
difficulties “busi”,“far”,“lost”
exaggerated “entir”,“extrem”,“real”
small “small”,“little”
retention “keep”,“remain”,“rememb”
reflection “rememb”,“know”,“thought”
assent “yes”,“okay”,“ok”
persons “man”,“person”,“peopl”
searching “found”,“request”,“find”
decision “choos”,“pick”,“put”
tokens “sampl”,“prove”,“someth”
objects “meat”,“bread”,“ship”
foreign “foreign”,“state”,“white”
life “life”,“live”,“old”
common “usual”,“real”,“alway”
uses “put”,“use”,“fill”
transfers “western”,“union”,“moneygram”
